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ABSTRACT
Fault attacks are attacks in which an adversary with physical
access to a cryptographic device, say a smartcard, tampers
with the execution of an algorithm to retrieve secret mate-
rial. Since the seminal Bellcore attack on modular exponen-
tiation, there has been extensive work to discover new fault
attacks against cryptographic schemes and develop counter-
measures against such attacks. Originally focused on high-
level algorithmic descriptions, these efforts increasingly fo-
cus on concrete implementations. While lowering the ab-
straction level leads to new fault attacks, it also makes their
discovery significantly more challenging. In order to face
this trend, it is therefore desirable to develop principled,
tool-supported approaches that allow a systematic analy-
sis of the security of cryptographic implementations against
fault attacks.
We propose, implement, and evaluate a new approach
for finding fault attacks against cryptographic implementa-
tions. Our approach is based on identifying implementation-
independent mathematical properties, or fault conditions.
We choose fault conditions so that it is possible to recover
secret data purely by computing on sufficiently many data
points that satisfy them. Fault conditions capture the essence
of a large number of attacks from the literature, including
lattice-based attacks on RSA. Moreover, they provide a ba-
sis for discovering automatically new attacks: using fault
conditions, we specify the problem of finding faulted imple-
mentations as a program synthesis problem. Using a special-
ized form of program synthesis, we discover multiple faulted
attacks on RSA and ECDSA. Several of the attacks found
by our tool are new, and of independent interest.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Embedded devices often play a central role in security ar-
chitectures for large-scale software infrastructures. For in-
stance, they are used pervasively for authentication, identity
management, or digital signatures. As a consequence, em-
bedded devices are also a prime target for attackers. There
are primarily two means to retrieve secret material from
embedded devices. The first one is to carry non-invasive
monitoring of the device and to obtain information from
side-channels, such as timing and power consumption, elec-
tromagnetic radiations, or even noise. The second one is to
perform active attacks, injecting faults that interfere with
the normal execution of the devices, and to recover the se-
cret information through the device’s normal interface, or
through side-channels. The effects of these faults vary: they
may modify the control flow of the program by skipping a
conditional test [2] or induce behaviours similar to buffer
overflows [20]. In the context of cryptographic attacks, they
often allow the adversary to directly recover secret keys.
There are various ways to inject faults in devices using, for
example, power spikes, glitches on the clock signal, temper-
ature variations, or electromagnetic radiations [2, 26, 4].
The existence of efficient fault attacks against crypto-
graphic schemes was first demonstrated in [13] by Boneh,
DeMillo and Lipton. They consider an algorithm, shown in
Figure 3, for computing RSA signatures using the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) and its standard recombination
formula:
S = (Sq · p−1 mod q) · p+ (Sp · q−1 mod p) · q mod N
where Sp and Sq are modular exponentiations of the reduc-
tions modulo p and q of the integer M that encodes the
message m. The algorithm is popular in practice, because it
achieves a significant speedup (approximately 4 times faster)
over the direct computation of S = Md mod N . The fault
attack Boneh et al. exhibit allows them to retrieve the fac-
torization of N , i.e. p and q, with a simple gcd computation.
This attack requires knowledge of a valid signature S and
a faulted signature Ŝ for the same padded message M . A
second attack, due to Lenstra [25], only requires knowledge
of a single faulted signature Ŝ for a known padded message
M . Injecting fault during the computation modulo p,
• in the first case, one can recover the factorization of N
from the identity gcd(S − Ŝ, N) = q;
• in the second case, one can recover the factorization of
N from the identity gcd(M − Ŝe, N) = q.
Both attacks, often known as the Bellcore attacks, are re-
stricted to deterministic encodings. However, Boneh et al.
describe another attack that applies to probabilistic encod-
ings; unfortunately, this third attack is not as efficient as the
others. In fact, it is only very recently that Fouque, Guiller-
min, Leresteux, Tibouchi and Zapalowicz [19] propose the
first efficient fault attacks against RSA-CRT signatures with
probabilistic encodings; their attacks are applicable against
PKCS#1 v2.0 (PSS) signatures. In addition to the RSA-
CRT signature considered in [13], Fouque et al. consider
another variant of RSA-CRT (Figure 4) based on Garner’s
recombination formula:
S = Sq + q · (q−1 · (Sp − Sq) mod p)
However, the main difference between [13] and [19] lies
in their level of description of RSA-CRT: whereas Boneh et
al. [13] consider a high-level algorithmic description in which
modular exponentiation is treated abstractly, Fouque et al.
consider reasonably detailed implementations, going down
to algorithmic descriptions of modular multiplication. They
consider four different implementations of modular expo-
nentiation, among which the Square-and-Multiply algorithm
and Montgomery’s modular exponentiation algorithm [32].
Figure 1 shows the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning
(CIOS) algorithm for modular multiplication, used in Mont-
gomery’s modular exponentiation algorithm (shown in Fig-
ure 2). Fouque et al. show that, by injecting faults in the im-
plementations of Montgomery modular multiplication, one
can obtain faulted signatures Ŝ that are close multiples of
p or q, and then use lattice-based techniques to recover the
factorization of N with about 50 faulty signatures. This
example provides strong evidence that analyzing implemen-
tations rather than algorithmic descriptions can lead to the
discovery of interesting attacks. However, it also highlights
a number of difficulties with this approach:
1. the number of faulted implementations grows at least
exponentially in the length of the original program, in par-
ticular if multiple faults are considered;
2. some fault attacks require to tamper with some (but
not all) loop iterations, or to add or remove some loop itera-
tions; hence, the number of faulted implementations cannot
be bounded solely based on the length of the program;
3. analyzing the effects of faults becomes very involved
and error-prone, in particular for programs with loops;
4. there exist multiple implementations of basic arith-
metic operations, requiring to repeat the analysis for each;
5. there might exist numerous countermeasures against a
fault attack, requiring to repeat the analysis for each of the
protected implementations.
This current trend towards analyzing security against fault
attacks of implementations rather than high-level algorithmic
descriptions is not specific to RSA signatures. In fact, it is
also witnessed in elliptic curve cryptography. Biehl, Meyer
and Mu¨ller [12] were among the first to consider fault at-
tacks against elliptic curve cryptosystems; more specifically,
they consider an elliptic curve variant of ElGamal encryp-
tion. Their attacks exploit some of the ideas from Boneh
et al. and are cast in the setting of a high-level algorithmic
description of scalar multiplication between a field element
and a point in the curve. These attacks were generalized to
a more concrete setting by Ciet and Joye [16]. Later, Nac-
cache, Nguyen, Tunstall and Whelan [36] exhibit fault at-
tacks on implementations of DSA and its elliptic curve vari-
ant ECDSA, whose description is given in Figure 6. Their
attack introduces a fault during the generation of the nonce
k and is cast in an algorithmic setting. In contrast, more
recent works [41, 3, 9, 31] study fault attacks against im-
plementations of ECDSA, based on detailed accounts of in-
teger multiplication, scalar multiplication, and point dou-
bling. For example, the attack on integer multiplication [3]
by Barenghi et al. works by injecting faults during the inte-
ger multiplication of a known random value and the secret
key. Then, by considering the textbook multiplication im-
plementation, they show that it is possible to recover the se-
cret key. Finally, the attack of [31] shows that it is possible to
inject a fault during the conversion from projective to affine
coordinates. These two attacks show that it is beneficial
to consider all steps of an implementation-level description
when looking for fault attacks. Our goal in this paper is to
search for fault attacks by considering full implementation-
level descriptions of cryptographic algorithms.
1: function CIOS(x, y)
2: a← 0
3: y0 ← y mod b
4: for j = 0 to k − 1 do
5: a0 ← a mod b
6: uj ← (a0 + xj · y0) · q′ mod b
7: a←
⌊a+ xj · y + uj · q
b
⌋
8: end for
9: if a ≥ q then a← a− q
10: end if
11: return a
12: end function
Figure 1: The Montgomery multiplication algo-
rithm. The xi’s and yi’s are the digits of x and y
in base b; q′ = −q−1 mod b is precomputed. The re-
turned value is (xy · b−k mod q). Since b = 2r, the
division is a bit shift.
Our contributions
The thesis of this work is that it is beneficial to develop
and implement rigorous methodologies for discovering fault
attacks on cryptographic implementations. To support our
thesis, we propose and validate experimentally a principled,
tool-supported approach for discovering fault attacks on cryp-
tographic implementations. Our approach relies on two broad
contributions:
1. identifying fault conditions, a novel concept that cap-
tures the essence of fault attacks in a logical, implementation
independent setting;
1: function ExpLadder(x, e, q, c)
2: x¯← CIOS(x,R2 mod q)
3: A← R mod q
4: for i = t down to 0 do
5: if ei = 0 then
6: x¯← CIOS(A, x¯)
7: A← CIOS(A,A)
8: else if ei = 1 then
9: A← CIOS(A, x¯)
10: x¯← CIOS(x¯, x¯)
11: end if
12: end for
13: A← CIOS(A, c)
14: return A
15: end function
Figure 2: Montgomery’s Ladder for computing mod-
ular exponentiations: ExpLadder(x, e, q, c) = x
e · c mod
q. e0, . . . , et are the bits of the exponent e (from
the least to the most significant), b is the base in
which computations are carried out (gcd(b, q) = 1)
and R = bk.
1: function SignRSA–CRT(m)
2: M ← µ(m) ∈ ZN . message encoding
3: S′p ← ExpLadder(M mod p, dp, p, q−1 mod p)
4: S′q ← ExpLadder(M mod q, dq, q, p−1 mod q)
5: S ← S′q · p+ S′p · q mod N
6: return S
7: end function
Figure 3: RSA–CRT signature generation. p and q
are large primes and N = pq is the modulus. The
public key is denoted by (N, e) and the associated
private key by (p, q, d). The reductions dp, dq modulo
p − 1, q − 1 of the private exponent, as well as the
p−1 mod q and q−1 mod p CRT coefficients, are pre-
computed.
2. applying a form of program synthesis on concrete cryp-
tographic implementations to automatically discover faulted
implementations that realize fault conditions and lead to at-
tacks.
A third, more practical contribution is an evaluation of our
approach on implementations of RSA and ECDSA signa-
tures. During the process, we discover several faulted im-
plementations, some of which lead to new attacks of inde-
pendent interest. We elaborate on these points below.
Fault conditions. The first contribution (Section 3) is of
methodological nature, and rests on the introduction of fault
conditions. Informally, fault conditions are implementation-
independent mathematical properties, specific to a crypto-
graphic system, which capture sufficient conditions under
which an attacker can launch a successful attack. Consider,
for instance, the case of RSA signatures with public RSA
modulus N = pq of length n. Any adversary with knowl-
edge of a value Sˆ that is multiple of p but not multiple of q
can obtain p by performing a simple GCD computation, and
then q by division. This is captured by the fault condition
Sˆ : Sˆ = 0 mod p ∧ Sˆ 6= 0 mod q
1: function SignRSA–Garner(m)
2: M ← µ(m) ∈ ZN . message encoding
3: Sp ← ExpLadder(M mod p, dp, p, 1)
4: Sq ← ExpLadder(M mod q, dq, q, 1)
5: t← Sp − Sq
6: if t < 0 then t← t+ p
7: end if
8: S ← Sq +
(
(t · pi) mod p) · q
9: return S
10: end function
Figure 4: RSA–Garner signature generation. The
Garner coefficient pi = q−1 mod p is precomputed.
1: function ECScalMul(k,P )
2: R0 ←∞
3: for i = t down to 0 do
4: R0 ← [2] ·R0
5: if ki = 1 then R0 ← R0 + P
6: end if
7: end for
8: return R0
9: end function
Figure 5: Scalar Multiplication of an elliptic curve
point by a field element. [2] · denotes point doubling,
and + denotes point addition.
Figure 7 summarizes some relevant instances of fault condi-
tions for RSA signatures; in Section 3, we also consider fault
conditions for ECDSA signatures. For each of the fault con-
ditions we consider, we exhibit an attack for retrieving the
secret key. Broadly speaking, the attacks fall into two cat-
egories. The first one encompasses attacks that perform an
elementary computation from a value satisfying the fault
condition. The second one covers attacks that require many
values that satisfy the fault condition, and involve more com-
plex computations, typically based on lattice reductions. For
the latter, we implement the attacks in a computer algebra
system, and we experimentally validate their effectiveness
for different choices of parameters.
Fault Models and Policies. The literature offers a wide
range of fault models, that affect both data flow (for example
the null fault model in which integer variables can be set to
1: function SignECDSA(m)
2: h← H(m) . message encoding
3: k
$← [0, q − 1]
4: (u, v)← [k] · P
5: r ← u mod q; if r = 0 then goto step 3;
6: s← k−1(h+ rx) mod q; if s = 0 then goto step 3;
7: return (r, s)
8: end function
Figure 6: ECDSA signature based on an elliptic
curve E over a prime field Fp. P is a base point
of order q and H is a cryptographic hash function of
output length equal to the size of q. The private key
is an element x ∈ Fq and the public key is denoted
by (p, q,H, P,Q) with Q = [x]P .
Informal description Fault condition Attack technique Validity
S is a multiple of p S = 0 mod p ∧ S 6= 0 mod q GCD computation Prop. 1
S is an almost full linear combination of p and q ∃α, β. S = α p+ β q ∧ α, β < 2n2−ε Orthogonal lattices Prop. 2
S is an almost full affine transform of p or q ∃α, β. S = α p+ β ∧ α < q, β < 2n/2−ε Orthogonal lattices Prop. 3
Figure 7: Fault conditions for RSA signatures. The value of ε depends on the size n of the modulus and is a
multiple of the words size.
a null value) and control flow (for example, the instruction
skip fault model, where an instruction can be skipped). We
consider various fault policies, that subsume a wide range of
such fault model and provide fine-grained specifications of
the faults that can be performed on implementations. They
model faults using replacement clauses of the form (x, e)
where x is a variable and e is an expression, or (c, c′), where
c and c′ are commands. These clauses respectively state that
it is possible to replace x by e, and c by c′ in the execution
of the program.
Automated synthesis of faulted implementations. Iden-
tifying fault conditions that allow efficient attacks to exist
is a manual process that requires cryptographic expertise,
and some good understanding of the mathematical tools
available for cryptanalysis. The significant pay-off of fault
conditions is that the process of finding complying faulted
implementations can be automated. Our second contribu-
tion (Section 4) is a fully automated method for discover-
ing faulted implementations that verify the fault condition.
Our method can be seen as an instance of program synthe-
sis, an area that is currently undergoing rapid and signifi-
cant progress (see Section 6). Broadly construed, the goal of
program synthesis is to find, given a specification φ (for in-
stance, φ might capture the input/output behavior of a pro-
gram), a set of programs that satisfy φ. Because synthesis
is computationally expensive, there exist many specialized
forms of program synthesis that restrict the search space
using non-functional requirements or by providing a partial
description of the desired programs. We also specialize our
synthesis algorithm to keep it computationally reasonable.
Specifically, our algorithm takes as input a fault condition
φ, an implementation c, and searches for all faulted imple-
mentations of c that satisfy φ. The search is constrained by
two additional inputs. The first additional input is a fault
policy; the second, optional input is an upper bound on the
number of faults we allow.
Our algorithm exploits many of the standard techniques
used in other approaches to program synthesis, including
weakest preconditions and invariant generation, and inter-
faces with SMT solvers for checking the validity of first-order
formulae. In addition, our algorithm relies on an automated
prover to simplify the intermediate conditions generated by
weakest precondition computations; the prover is specialized
to formulae that combine arithmetic inequalities and size
constraints; such formulae include many fault conditions, in-
cluding all those we explore in this paper (see Figure 7). On
the other hand, our algorithm noticeably departs from recent
works on program synthesis by its simplicity: indeed, phys-
ical limits on the number and nature of faults sufficiently
constrain the search space for faulted implementations, al-
lowing us to dispense from using more elaborate techniques
that are required to manage very large search spaces (see
Section 6). Experimental results, which we report below,
demonstrate that our synthesis algorithm performs well on
standard examples.
Application: old and new attacks on RSA and ECDSA
signatures. The third contribution of our work is a prac-
tical evaluation of our approach on RSA and ECDSA sig-
natures. We carry out the evaluation using the computer
algebra system SAGE, and the EasyCrypt tool1. Concretely,
we use the former for estimating the effectiveness of lattice-
based attacks for different fault conditions, and the latter
(or more precisely an implementation of our synthesis al-
gorithm built on top of EasyCrypt) for synthesizing faulted
implementations of RSA and ECDSA signatures. During
the process, we rediscover many known attacks; moreover,
we also discover many new attacks, several of which are ef-
ficient attacks of independent interest. We summarize our
main findings below:
1. For RSA-CRT signatures based on Garner’s recombi-
nation, we recover the basic and most efficient attack of [19]
which injects a null fault in the last call to CIOS during the
computation of modular exponentiation. We also discover
a new efficient attack, based on forcing additional iterations
in the last call to CIOS. This attack yields almost full affine
transforms of p or q, a small number of which is sufficient to
recover the factorization of the RSA modulus using orthog-
onal lattices or Simultaneous Diophantian Approximations
as in [21, 27].
2. For RSA-CRT signatures based on the usual CRT re-
combination, we discover a new fault attack; to our best
knowledge, this is the first efficient fault attack that works
with randomized padding. The attack is based on forcing ad-
ditional iterations in the last call to CIOS and yields almost
full linear combinations of p and q. From a small number of
such faulty signatures, the factorization of the RSA modulus
can easily be recovered using orthogonal lattices.
3. For ECDSA signatures, we discover several new and
efficient fault attacks for implementations based on the im-
plementation of scalar multiplication given in Figure 5. A
first attack is based on skipping the last iterations in the
computation of scalar multiplication. A second attack is
based on forcing the evaluation of a conditional inside the
loop executed for the computation. The largest group of at-
tacks (containing more than 100 faulted programs) is based
on faulting the implementation of the point addition opera-
tion. Each faulted signature allows us to recover the least or
most significant bits of the nonce; we then finish the attack
using classic techniques, and obtain the secret key from a
small number of faulty signatures. We also recover an exist-
ing attack [36] that lets the faulted algorithm produce valid
signatures that may nevertheless be exploited in a similar
fashion.
1https://www.easycrypt.info
2. BACKGROUND ON LATTICES
Lattice reduction is a powerful tool that is extensively
used in the cryptanalysis of public-key cryptosystems. In
this section, we provide a brief introduction to some key
definitions and algorithms that are used in the paper. More
background is given in the long version of this paper [7].
A lattice L is a subgroup of Zn, i.e. a non-empty set
of vectors closed under addition and inverse. Every lattice
L has a basis, i.e. a finite set of linearly independent vec-
tors that generate all elements in L. Conversely, every set
(b1, . . . , b`) of linearly independent vectors over Zn gener-
ate a lattice L = 〈b1, . . . , b`〉 consisting of all integer linear
combinations of the bi’s.
A central problem with lattices is to compute nearly re-
duced bases, i.e. bases that consist of reasonably short and
almost orthogonal vectors. There exist many efficient algo-
rithms for performing lattice reductions, including the cel-
ebrated Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz (LLL) algorithm [30] and
Block Korkin-Zolotarev (BKZ) variants [42]. Lattice reduc-
tion is an essential tool in cryptanalysis, and we use it exten-
sively in our attacks. In theory, LLL outputs in polynomial-
time a reduced basis and each vector of the base is related
to the shortest ones by an approximation factor which is ex-
ponential in the dimension. BKZ algorithms allow different
tradeoff between the quality of the approximation and the
time complexity. In practice, LLL implementations are very
fast and when the dimension is much less than 200 [45], it
is expected that LLL produces shorter vectors than other
algorithms since its approximation factor is α ≈ 1.01, as
shown experimentally in [22]. In larger dimensions, the ap-
proximation factor increases (unless we greatly increase the
time complexity) and the success probability of our attacks
is reduced. To any lattice L in Zn is associated its orthogo-
nal lattice L⊥, defined as the set of all vectors in Zn that are
orthogonal to all vectors of L. It is possible to reduce the
computation of the orthogonal lattice to lattice reduction in
polynomial time [38]. Orthogonal lattices were introduced
in cryptanalysis by Nguyen and Stern in [37], and have since
found many applications [38].
3. FAULT CONDITIONS
The primary goal of fault attacks is to induce outputs
which satisfy an implementation-independent, mathematical
property that guarantees that the secret key or some other
confidential data can be efficiently recovered. Our approach
critically relies on providing a precise formalization of these
mathematical conditions, using fault conditions. Informally,
a fault condition is a statement of the form
v1, . . . , vn : φ; s1, . . . , sk
where φ is a logical formula that depend on v1, . . . , vn, and
such that an attacker with access to sufficiently many dis-
tinct tuples of values (v1, . . . , vn) satisfying φ is able to re-
cover secrets s1, . . . , sk (typically parameters of the cryp-
tosystem) with high probability. More formally, φ is a first-
order formula over some first-order theory T , for instance
modular arithmetic, and all variables that appear free in φ
but not on the left of the colon can only denote parameters
of the cryptosystem.
In this section, we introduce several fault conditions for
RSA and ECDSA schemes, and show how, given sufficiently
many satisfying values, one can efficiently retrieve either the
factorization of the modulus (for the RSA case) or the secret
key (for the ECDSA case). Many of these conditions appear
implicitly in some variant form in the literature.
Convention. All the conditions we consider are of the form
v1, . . . , vn : φ ; p, q for RSA and v1, . . . , vn : φ ; x for
ECDSA. Since the secret values s1, . . . , sk are determined by
the case study, from now on we simply write v1, . . . , vn : φ.
3.1 Fault conditions for RSA signatures
Throughout this section, we assume that N is an RSA
modulus of size n, product of two large primes p and q.
Proofs are detailed in the long version of this paper [7].
Finding multiples of p or q. Our first fault condition con-
siders faulted signatures that are a multiple of p or q. This
fault condition enables attacks on RSA by simple gcd com-
putations.
Proposition 1. Given a single value S satisfying the con-
dition:
S : S ≡ 0 mod p ∧ S 6≡ 0 mod q,
one can efficiently factor the RSA modulus N . Obviously
the same result holds by switching p and q.
Proof. One can retrieve the factorization of N by per-
forming a simple gcd computation between S and N .
This fault condition is implicit for instance in [19].
Finding “almost full” linear combinations of p and q.
Our second fault condition considers faulted signatures that
are linear combinations of p and q with almost full coeffi-
cients. A variant of this fault condition is implicit in [14].
Proposition 2. Assume that N is a balanced RSA mod-
ulus, i.e. N = p · q such that p, q < 2n/2. Given a sufficient
number of values that satisfy the fault condition:
S : ∃x, y. S = x · p+ y · q ∧ x, y < 2n/2−ε
with ε > 0, one can efficiently factor the RSA modulus N .
The value of ε depends on n and impacts the efficiency and
success probability of the algorithm to recover the factoriza-
tion.
Relating this fault condition with [14]. In [14], the au-
thors force random faults on the modulus during CRT re-
combination and obtain a fault condition of the following
form.
Ŝ : ∃α, β. Ŝ = α·p(p−1 mod q)+β·q(q−1 mod p)∧α, β < 2n/2.
If our condition is similar to theirs, the algorithmic prob-
lem ours captures is more general. Indeed, in the analysis,
the crucial parameter is the ratio between the size of p, q
and the size of α, β in the relation S = α · p + β · q. The
larger this ratio is, the easier the attack is since the target
vector, called u above is larger. In our case, the size of this
vector is close to 2ε/
√
` while [14] consider a much larger
one (their ratio is
√
N/`).
p, q 512 (bits) 1024 (bits)
xi, yi 464 472 480 496 968 976 984 992
` 22 26 33 74 37 44 53 67
Figure 8: Minimal number of signatures ` to be
faulted depending on the bitsize of xi, yi. Almost
full linear combinations of p and q.
p, q 512 (bits) 1024 (bits)
xi, yi 464 472 480 496 968 976 984 992
` 23 28 35 77 39 46 56 71
Figure 9: Minimal number of signatures ` to be
faulted depending on the bitsize of yi. Almost full
affine transforms of p or q.
Finding “almost full” affine transforms of p or q. Our
third fault condition considers faulted signatures that are
almost full affine transforms of p or q. This condition is
implicit in [19].
Proposition 3. Assume that N is a balanced RSA mod-
ulus, i.e. p, q such that p, q < 2n/2. Given a sufficient num-
ber of values that satisfy the fault condition:
S : ∃x, y. S = x · p+ y ∧ x < q, |y| < 2n/2−ε,
one can efficiently factor the RSA modulus N . The value ε
depends on n and impacts the efficiency and success proba-
bility of the algorithm to recover the factorization.
Implementation and evaluation of key recovery
We now describe how the attacks outlined above can be
performed in practice. Moreover, we estimate the number
of signatures required for recovering the factorization.
Implementation. We use the SAGE computer algebra sys-
tem [45] to implement the attacks. The attacks take as
input a sufficient number of signatures S1, · · · , S` satisfying
the fault condition given in Proposition 2 or Proposition 3.
The implementation heuristically recovers the factorization
of the RSA modulus N as follows.
• Compute an LLL-reduced basis {b1, · · · , b`−1} of the
lattice (S1, · · · , S`)⊥. This is done by applying LLL
to the lattice in Z1+` generated by the rows of the
following matrix: κS1 1 0... . . .
κS` 0 1

where κ is a suitably large constant, and removing the
first component of each resulting vector [37].
• Compute an LLL-reduced basis {x′, y′} of the orthog-
onal lattice {b1, · · · , b`−2}⊥. Again, this is done by
applying LLL to the lattice in Z`−2+` generated by
the rows of κ
′b1,1 · · · κ′b`−2,1 1 0
...
...
. . .
κ′b1,` · · · κ′b`−2,1 0 1

and keeping the last ` components of each resulting
vector.
• For all the linear combinations z of x′ and y′ that sat-
isfy the size constraints, compute the test gcd(z1S2 −
z2S1, N) or gcd(y1 − S1, N), depending on the fault
condition considered, which allows to recover the prime
factors p and q.
Evaluation. We use our SAGE implementation to evaluate
the number of signatures required for the attacks to succeed.
The results are given in Figures 8 and 9. We see for instance
that 35 values are required to retrieve the factorization of
N when p and q are 1024-bit and the size of the xis and yis
have size 960, i.e. 64 bits shorter than the full size.
3.2 Fault conditions for ECDSA signatures
For ECDSA signatures, we consider fault conditions of a
different nature, that rely on partial knowledge of the nonce
k used in the computation. We first consider a novel fault
condition focusing only on faulting the scalar multiplication.
Then, we discuss an already-exploited fault condition where
k can be faulted during both the scalar multiplication and
the computation of its inverse, as considered in [36]. In both
cases, knowing some bits of the nonce k is sufficient to mount
a classic lattice-based attack. In the following, we assume
that the message to be signed is known and its hash value is
h and we denote abs the abscissa of an elliptic curve point,
lsb` k the ` least significant bits of k and for the right-shift
operator.
Faulting r. Our fault condition considers faulted signatures
such that r is computed using only some of the bits of k:
Proposition 4. Given sufficiently many values satisfy-
ing one of the fault conditions:
r, s : ∃k. r = abs([k  `] · P ) ∧ s = k−1(h+ rx) mod q
(1)
r, s : ∃k. r = abs(±[2`] · [k  `] · P ) ∧ s = k−1(h+ rx) mod q
(2)
one can efficiently retrieve the secret key x.
The proof of this proposition can be done in two parts,
summed up by two facts. We do the proof for condition (1),
but a similar proof applies for condition (2). In particular,
Fact 2 tells us that it is sufficient to be able to recover `
bits of k to recover the secret key x, and the proof of Fact 1
generalizes to condition (2), since it revolves around compu-
tations on curve points ±[2`] · [k  `] · P .
Fact 1. Given a single pair (r, s) that satisfies the fault
condition:
r, s : ∃k. r = abs([k  `] · P ) ∧ s = k−1(h+ rx) mod q,
one can efficiently retrieve the ` least significant bits of k.
Now, given sufficiently many faulty signatures, the secret
x can be recovered using a technique based on lattices.
Fact 2. Given a sufficient number of ECDSA signatures
whose nonces k are partially known, one can efficiently re-
trieve the secret key x.
Note to conclude that a similar result holds for the most
significant bits. For example, condition 1 in this case could
be written as follows.
r, s : r = abs([k mod 2n−`]P ) ∧ s = k−1(h+ rx) mod q.
In this case, we retrieve the most significant bits of the
nonces and adapt the lattice to this case without difficulty.
Using short randomness: faulting r and s.. We also con-
sider the following fault condition, implicitly used in the
original attack on ECDSA by Nguyen et al. [36], where both
the scalar multiplication and field inversion are faulted to
simulated short values for k (that is, values whose most sig-
nificant or least significant bits are zero).
Proposition 5 ([36]). Given a sufficient number of pairs
(r, s) that satisfy the fault condition:
r, s : ∃k. r = abs([lsb(k)] · P ) ∧ s = lsb(k)−1(h+ rx) mod q,
one can efficiently recover the secret key x.
Although we do not prove it, the validity of this fault
condition is justified by its use in existing attacks.
q 160 (bits) 256 (bits) 384 (bits)
` 4 8 16 8 16 32 8 16
d 61 ( '70%) 23 11 38 17 9 61 26
Figure 10: Minimal number of signatures d to
be faulted depending on ` using curves brain-
poolP160r1, brainpoolP256r1 and brainpoolP384r1.
The percentage given in one case represents the suc-
cess rate of the attack and could be increased by
increasing the value of d.
Implementation and evaluation.. We also implement our
key recovery attacks on ECDSA in Sage to evaluate their
performance. Some experimental values of (`, d) are given
in Figure 10.
3.3 Discussion
All the fault conditions considered above are intended to
predicate over the output of faulted signatures. However,
fault conditions may also relate outputs of faulted and valid
signatures, or inputs and outputs of signatures. Examples
of such fault conditions are given by the original Bellcore
attack and by Lenstra’s variant:
S1, S2 : S1 − S2 ≡ 0 mod p ∧ S1 − S2 6≡ 0 mod q
M, S : S −Me ≡ 0 mod p ∧ S −Me 6≡ 0 mod q
Both conditions can be further refined. For instance, the
fault condition for the Bellcore attack can be refined to ex-
press that one of the Si, say for instance S1, is a valid sig-
nature of a message m, and S2 is a faulty signature of m. In
fact, one can define a partial order on fault conditions2 and
prove that the above fault conditions are less than the fault
condition given in Proposition 1.
2 (v1, . . . , vn : φ) ≤ (w1, . . . , wm : ψ) if there exists
an efficient and public n-ary function f that returns m-
tuples of values and such that for every v1, . . . , vn such
that φ(v1, . . . , vn) holds and for every w1, . . . , wm such that
f(v1, . . . , vn) = (w1, . . . , wm), we also have ψ(w1, . . . , wm).
C ::= skip
| C; C sequencing
| V ← E deterministic assignment
| V $← DE random assignment
| if E then C else C conditional
| while E do C while loop
| V ← P(E , . . . , E) procedure call
| return E return expression
where V denotes the set of variables, E denotes the set of
expressions, DE denotes the set of distribution expressions
and P denotes the set of procedures.
Figure 11: Syntax of programs
4. SYNTHESIS OF FAULTED IMPLEMEN-
TATIONS
In this section, we present an automated tool that synthe-
sizes faulted implementations that verify a fault condition.
Our tool is built on top of EasyCrypt [8], a tool-assisted
framework for verifying the security of cryptographic con-
structions.
4.1 Programming and assertion language
We consider programs that are written in a core imper-
ative language with deterministic and probabilistic assign-
ments, conditionals, loops, procedure calls, and sequential
composition; the syntax of programs is given in Figure 11.
The programming language essentially subsumes the lan-
guage proposed in [11] and in particular is sufficiently ex-
pressive to capture cryptographic implementations.
Expressions used in programs, for instance on the right-
hand side of assignments or as guards in conditional state-
ments and loops are built inductively from user-defined con-
stants, operators, and variables. In this paper, we specifi-
cally focus on expressions that are built from operations for
modular arithmetic, and finite field and elliptic curve op-
erations. We use a simple type system for expressions and
programs, and we only consider well-typed programs.
Assertions are first-order formulae over the theories inher-
ited from the expression language. Reasoning about asser-
tions is delegated to the EasyCrypt proof engine, which can
either use lemmas from libraries or invoke SMT solvers to
prove the validity of an assertion.
4.2 Fault models and fault policies
Fault models. Fault models are high-level specifications of
the type of faults that can be injected on embedded devices;
they generally target specific architectures, and are designed
to reflect the effects and capacities of specific perturbation
techniques.
For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to know that
there exist two broad classes of fault models. The first class
captures faults that modify the dataflow, for instance by set-
ting a particular register to a default value (the null fault
model) or to a constant but unknown value (the constant
fault model), or by setting part of the register to a constant
value (the zero high-order bits fault model and its variants).
In practice, it is often important to consider models that
combine several kinds of faults; for instance, one can con-
sider a fault model which allows null faults on small registers,
and constant faults on larger registers. Such faults are con-
sidered for example in [20], where the authors also justify
their practical feasibility. The second class captures faults
that modify the control flow, for instance by skipping an
instruction (the instruction skip model), by forcing a condi-
tional instruction to enter into a specific branch (the branch
fault model), or by forcing the execution of a loop to be in-
terrupted before the guard is set to false, or continued after
it is set to false (the loop fault model). These models are
classic and are considered in [39], for instance. Both mod-
els overlap, in the sense that one can sometimes achieve the
same effect by a dataflow fault attack, or by a control flow
fault attack.
Fault policies. Instead of hardcoding the different fault
models, our tool allows users to specify fine-grained fault
policies that delineate very precisely the space of faulted
implementations by describing which faults can be injected
in the program. Fault policies are program specific, and are
given by two sets of replacement clauses.
The first set consists of variable replacement clauses of the
form (x, e) where x is a program variable and e is an expres-
sion; such a clause says that one can replace the variable
x by the expression e in the course of program execution.
These declarations can be used to model data faults; for in-
stance, the null fault on x is captured by the clause (x, 0),
whereas the zero high order bits fault on x that sets r bits
to zero is captured by the clause (x,msbr(x)).
The second set consists of command replacement clauses
of the form (c, c′), where c and c′ are commands; such a
clause says that one can replace the command c by the com-
mand c′ in the course of program execution. These declara-
tions can be used to model control flow faults; for instance,
instruction skip faults on an assignment c is captured by
the clause (c, skip), whereas branch faults are captured by
the clause (if b then c1 else c2, ci) where i = 1 if the goal
is to force execution to go into the true branch, and i = 2,
otherwise. By convention, we require that all instruction re-
placements do not increase the set of modified variables, i.e.
the set of modified variables of a command c′ is a subset of
the set of modified variables of the command c it replaces.
This is the case for all control flow attacks described above,
and is essential for the completeness of our tool.
Although it is useful in practice, fault policies do not cur-
rently include a mechanism to impose any locality constraint
on the clauses, i.e. replacements may occur anywhere in
the program. This can easily be circumvented by writing
programs in pseudo-SSA form, for instance by adding sub-
scripts for the different occurences of the same variable in
the program.
Finally, fault policies may also include some upper bounds
on the number of times a clause can be used to fault an
implementation. This is useful to constrain the space of
faulted implementations and to match physical constraints.
Discussion. There is a direct relation between fault models
and fault policies, in the sense that every fault model deter-
mines a unique fault policy for each program. However,
many fault attacks require multiple faults and can only be
captured by hybrid fault models, that combine several sim-
pler ones. An example of hybrid fault model is one that
considers null faults on variables that denote small registers
(for instance, variables that store values smaller than 28),
and constant faults on variables representing larger regis-
ters.
It would be interesting to develop a high-level language
for describing hybrid fault models, and a compiler for gen-
erating automatically fault policies from high-level specifica-
tions. However, building the compiler requires a significant
amount of infrastructure, including the ability to automat-
ically infer program invariants: for the example discussed
above, the compiler would need to infer that the value held
by a variable x is always smaller than 28 in order to gener-
ate the clause (x, 0). We leave the design of this high-level
language and the implementation of the compiler for future
work, and require for now that fault policies (albeit in some
edulcorated form) are given as input to the tool.
4.3 Algorithm
Our tool takes as input a (non-faulted) implementation
written in the programming language of EasyCrypt, a fault
condition, a fault policy, and optionally a precondition ψ.
It outputs a set of faulted implementations that satisfy the
fault condition and are valid faults of the original implemen-
tation with respect to the fault model considered. The core
of the tool is an algorithm that interleaves the computation
of weakest preconditions, logical simplifications, and genera-
tion of faults. For simplicity, we describe a non-deterministic
and inefficient version of the algorithm, whereas the imple-
mentation uses a more efficient implementation, and some
caching and early pruning techniques for the smart explo-
ration of the search space. We initially explain how the
algorithm works on straightline programs, i.e. programs
without loops, conditionals, and procedure calls. Then, we
explain how to extend the algorithm to procedure calls and
loops. First, we define the notion of faulted instruction.
Faulted commands. The fault policy determines for each
command c of the program a set of faulted instances, consist-
ing of commands c′ that can be obtained from c according
to the fault policy. All commands are faulted instances of
themselves, and moreover the command c′ is a faulted in-
stance of c if there exists an instruction replacement clause
(c, c′). Moreover, there are some specific rules for each con-
struct of the language.
• x ← e[e1, . . . , en/y1, . . . , yn] is a faulted instance of
x← e, provided for i = 1 . . . n, the replacements of yi
by ei are allowed by the fault policy.
• the commands while b do c′, and if b then c′;while b do c,
and while b′ do c; if b then c′ are all faulted instances of
while b do c, where c′ is a faulted instance of c, and b′
is a guard that forces exactly one less iteration of the
loop body.
The last clause captures faults on the first and last iteration
of a loop, and can be extended to model faults on the first
and last k iterations of a loop, for k ≥ 1.
Straightline programs. The algorithm is given as input
a fault policy, and manipulates triples of the form (c, φ, ĉ).
Initially, the algorithm is given the triple (c, φ, skip) consist-
ing of the program being analyzed against fault attacks, the
fault condition, and the empty statement. At each iteration,
the algorithm consumes the last command of c and outputs
a new triple (c′, φ′, ĉ′) as follows;
1. c is decomposed into a sequence c′; i, where i is the last
command of the program (necessarily an assignment or
a random sampling). If c is empty, then the algorithm
checks if φ is a consequence of the precondition, and
returns ĉ if this is the case and nothing otherwise;
2. the algorithm checks whether i affects φ, i.e. if any
of the variables modified by i occur in φ. If not, the
algorithm breaks to the next iteration with (c′, φ, ĉ′),
where ĉ′ = i; ĉ;
3. if some variable modified by i occurs in φ, then the
algorithm chooses non-deterministically a faulted in-
stance i′ of i;
4. the algorithm computes the weakest precondition of
i′ on φ. For instance, the rules for computing weak-
est preconditions of deterministic and random assign-
ments are:
WP(x← e, φ) = φ{x← e}
WP(x $← d, φ) = ∀v ∈ dom(d), φ{x← v},
where dom(d) is the set of values that have a non-
zero probability in d. Note that the weakest precon-
dition computation takes an assertion and returns an
assertion. This is achieved by viewing probabilistic as-
signments as non-deterministic assignments over the
domain of the distribution from which the assignment
is sampled;
5. the algorithm applies logical simplifications to the as-
sertion φ output by the weakest precondition compu-
tation. The output is a new assertion φ′ that has fewer
free variables than φ;
6. the algorithm proceeds to the next iteration with state
(c, φ′, ĉ′), where ĉ′ = i′; ĉ.
Breaking to the next iteration in step 2 and performing log-
ical simplifications in Step 5 may in fact significantly prune
the search space, without ruling out any potential attacks:
computing the weakest precondition on a command i whose
left-hand-side does not appear in the fault condition never
changes that fault condition, whichever fault may be se-
lected. Indeed, our algorithm is sound and relatively com-
plete for straightline code, in the sense that, given an oracle
that can decide logical implications, the algorithm would re-
turn all faulted versions c′ of c such that the Hoare triple
{ψ}c′{φ} is valid. In practice, logical implications are veri-
fied using SMT solvers, and hence the implementation might
actually fail to find a valid fault attack.
Procedure calls. Our tool deals with programs that make
non-recursive procedure calls by entering into the code of the
procedure when reaching a call. This is intuitively equiva-
lent to inlining all procedure calls and applying the non-
procedural analysis to the inlined code. Although it is cer-
tainly possible to develop more sophisticated approaches, in-
cluding ones that deal with recursive procedure calls, based
on state-of-the-art techniques, our elementary approach has
the advantage of simplicity and is sufficient for most imple-
mentations of cryptographic algorithms.
Loops. Dealing with loops is the main source of complex-
ity for our tool, as computing weakest preconditions re-
quires knowing some useful loop invariants, i.e. assertions
that hold throughout all iterations of the loop body. We
provide two elementary mechanisms for dealing with loops:
an invariant generator, and an algorithm for turning (user-
provided) invariants for non-faulted loops into invariants for
their faulted instances. There is admittedly significant scope
for improving these mechanisms, in particular by building
upon recent developments in invariant generation; we leave
this avenue for future work.
Pruning. We use two main pruning techniques for improv-
ing the efficiency of the search algorithm. First, since SMT
solvers are a clear performance bottleneck, we cache all SMT
queries and their result. Second, we maintain a table of all
intermediate statements (c, φ, ĉ), and abort execution when-
ever the algorithm computes a triple which coincides in the
first and second component with an element of the table.
5. APPLICATIONS
Using our tool, we are able to discover many attacks on
implementations of RSA-CRT and ECDSA signatures. Sev-
eral of these attacks are new, and of independent interest.
In this section, we review in some detail the most relevant
attacks we find.
5.1 RSA-CRT signatures
We consider a CRT-based implementation of RSA that
uses the Montgomery ladder (Figure 2) for modular expo-
nentiation and the CIOS algorithm (Figure 1) for modu-
lar multiplication. We consider implementations using both
Garner’s recombination algorithm (Figure 4) and the stan-
dard CRT recombination with optimizations (Figure 3). Most
of the attacks we find involve faults injected during the last
call to CIOS in the ladder (line 13, Figure 2), which takes
the result of the exponentiation back into its classical rep-
resentation. We assume that the parameter x in CIOS is
stored in a shift-register, used to extract its individual dig-
its in base b.
Finding multiples of p or q. Using the fault condition from
Proposition 1, and allowing null faults on small variables
(that contain integers mod b) we recover the most basic
and efficient attack of [19], which sets q′ to 0 during the
final call to CIOS(S¯q, 1). In addition, the tool also finds
several variants of the fault, indicating which (combinations
of) variables can be set to 0 to fulfill the fault condition.
For example, setting both uj and xj to 0 throughout the
computation still yields a null result.
This attack and its variants only work when the final call
to CIOS occurs with 1 as second argument. This is not
always the case when CRT recombination is used, since the
call to CIOS can be used to optimize a multiplication away as
illustrated in Figure 3. In this case, by adding control flow
faults to the fault policy, our tool also finds that faulting q′
to 0 and doubling the number of loop iterations during this
final call forces its result to zero. Indeed, in this case, after
the normal number of iterations, the shift-register initially
containing x contains zero and any further loop iteration
simply shifts a to the right, eventually forcing it to zero as
well. A much simpler, albeit much less elegant, control flow
fault involves simply faulting the initial loop condition so no
computation is performed.
Finding “almost full” linear transforms of p or q. It
may not always be possible to skip the loop entirely, or to
ensure that the loop is run at least twice as many times as
expected. However, it may be easier to inject faults on loop
counters that consistently add a small (possibly unknown)
number of iterations. Our tool automatically finds that such
faults, when q′ is set to zero during the additional loop iter-
ations are in fact sufficient to guarantee the fault condition
from Proposition 3 using both Garner and CRT recombi-
nation. For each additional iteration, the size of the expo-
nentiation’s result is reduced by the size of a base b digit,
quickly leading to a result that can be exploited by the clas-
sic lattice-based attacks described in Section 3.1.
Alternatively, instead of faulting the control flow and a
variable, our tool also finds that simply setting q′ and xj to
zero during the last iterations of the loop leads to a similarly
faulted signature, that fulfills the desired fault condition.
Finding “almost full” linear combinations of p and q.
When given the fault condition from Proposition 2, our tool
finds that running the previous size-reducing attacks on both
half-exponentiations yields a suitable faulted signature when
using the classic CRT recombination rather than Garner’s.
The relative efficiency of the lattice-based attack from Sec-
tion 3.1 compared to the one from Section 3.1 may justify
the additional faults.
5.2 ECDSA signatures
We also run our tool on the ECDSA signature algorithm.
We consider an implementation where scalar multiplication
is computed using MSB-first Double-and-Add (Figure 5).
The main challenge here is that the fault conditions we con-
sider are very precise, in the sense that they give a full func-
tional description of the result depending on some (faulted)
inputs. We therefore need not only to be able to find the
faults, but also to be able to prove the functional correctness
of the non-faulted algorithms.
Faults on the randomness. We first consider the fault con-
dition from Proposition 5, that we generalized from [36].
The tool finds that performing a zero-higher-order bit fault
on k after it is sampled is sufficient to guarantee the fault
condition (as we then have k = k  `). However, we do not
automatically find more complex attacks (that use proposi-
tion 5) on the algorithms computing scalar multiplications
and field element inversions. We believe that our tool would
in fact find such attacks given precise enough implementa-
tions for these operations, and precise enough loop invariants
for their non-faulted versions.
Faults on scalar multiplication.. Fault condition (1) from
Proposition 4 allows our algorithm to quickly focus the fault
search on the computation of the scalar multiplication in
ECDSA. The tool discovers that exiting the loop early when
computing [k] · P , and letting all other computations oc-
cur normally, yields signatures (r, s) that fulfill fault condi-
tion 4(1).
The second fault condition (2) from Proposition 4 leads
to a slightly more flexible overall attack, since it does not
require the number of faulted iterations to be known. Given
this fault condition and an abstract algorithmic description
of the ECDSA algorithm, our tool finds that forcing the
branch condition at line 5 (Figure 5) to false for a number of
iterations towards the end of the loop yields an exploitable
result. Generalizing, faulting line 6 or its implementation
such that it computes R0 ← ±R0 instead of R0 ← R0 + P
would yield the same result.
Faults on point addition. This observation leads us to con-
sider more concrete refinements of the point addition algo-
rithm. In particular, we consider a register-level algorithm
for Jacobian-Jacobian point addition, as presented by Mur-
dica [35, Algorithm 36]. This algorithm, shown in the long
version of this paper, is only correct when applied to distinct
curve points that are not at infinity or inverse of each other.
Given the implementation where the partial point addi-
tion algorithm is wrapped in tests ensuring it is applied cor-
rectly (that is, Q,R 6= ∞ and Q 6= ±R), our tool quickly
finds that faulting the conditional checks is sufficient to
force the fault condition: by faulting the test that checks
whether the second argument is infinite, we can easily force
the wrapped addition algorithm to return its first argument,
forcing the fault condition.
However, since the base point P is of order q, and R0 is
always a scalar multiple of P , such checks can be optimized
away when the addition algorithm is used for scalar multipli-
cation. With an additional condition that none of the scalar
multiples of P are on the vertical axis our tool finds null
faults, and some faults in combined models involving null
faults and instruction skips, that lead to the faulted com-
putation of R0 + P returning −R0. Performing this fault
during the last iterations of the Double-and-Add loop then
yields a faulted ECDSA signature that fulfills fault condi-
tion 4(2) and can be used in the lattice-based attack. Our
tool yields a list of more than 100 ways to fault point ad-
dition such that the faulted ECDSA signature fulfills fault
condition 4(2).
6. RELATEDWORK
Formal methods for cryptography. This work is more
closely related to a recent series of articles that apply for-
mal methods to fault attacks. However, our emphasis is on
finding fault attacks against implementations, whereas other
works focus on proving absence of fault attacks against algo-
rithmic descriptions or implementations. Two independent
efforts by Christofi, Chetali, Goubin and Vigilant [15] and
by Rauzy and Guilley [40] prove the absence of fault attacks
against RSA-CRT with Vigilant countermeasure. In a sim-
ilar spirit, Moro et al. [33] propose an approach based on
redundancy to protect implementations against instruction
skip attacks. More recently, Barthe, Dupressoir, Fouque,
Gre´goire, Tibouchi and Zapalowicz [6] formally verify the
security RSA-PSS against non-random faults using Easy-
Crypt [8].
Another recent series of papers use type systems and SMT
solvers for verifying whether cryptographic implementations
are correctly masked [34, 10, 18]; in particular, Eldib and
Wang [17] have developed a method for synthesizing mask-
ing countermeasures.
Synthesis. Program synthesis is an active area of research
that is undergoing rapid and significant progress, thanks
to novel and practically achievable approaches, and to ad-
vances in SMT solvers. In contrast to the early works that
pursue deductive program synthesis, where the program is
extracted from the proof of a theorem, typically a ∀∃ state-
ment, most of the current work focuses on inductive program
synthesis, and uses SMT solvers. Many works on induc-
tive synthesis, notably early ones, have focused on loop-free
programs [43, 23, 24]. Other recent works allow synthez-
ing programs with loops; for instance, Srivastava, Gulwani
and Foster [44] introduce proof-theoretic synthesis, a variant
of synthesis that combines inference of loop invariants and
synthesis of loop-free programs. However, this approach is
limited to programs whose loop invariants fall into a lim-
ited class of assertions. Syntax-guided program synthesis [1]
is a recently proposed framework that subsumes many of
the previous approaches to synthesis. One ambition of this
project is to develop a framework for testing and compar-
ing different implementations, and in particular to provide a
common input format inspired from SMT-LIB for synthesis
tools. In the future, it would be interesting to suggest auto-
mated discovery of fault attacks as a challenge for syntax-
guided synthesis competitions.
Our approach shares many similarities with program re-
pair, an instance of program synthesis that aims at automat-
ically eliminating deficiencies in code. Informally, a program
repair algorithm takes as input a program p and a property
φ that must be satisfied by the output of p, and computes
by small successive modifications of p a program p′ that sat-
isfies φ. There exist many approaches to program repair;
some of them are based on genetic algorithms [29], others
are based on code contracts [46]. We refer the reader to a
recent overview [28] for more information. The connection
with program repair is very direct; indeed, one can even view
faulted implementations as a form of program repair for the
attacker. However, the techniques used in program repair
are not immediately applicable to finding fault attacks on
cryptographic implementations.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented a new approach to discover automat-
ically fault attacks on cryptographic implementations. The
technical core of our approach is a new and practical form
of program synthesis. Pleasingly, the tool that implements
our approach is able to discover new and interesting attacks.
An exciting perspective for further work is to apply our tool
to an extensive class of implementations. There are also in-
teresting directions for improving and extending our tool.
The first one is to integrate state-of-the-art invariant gen-
eration and synthesis techniques in the tool. Another one
is to implement a synthesis algorithm based on relational
verification in order to deal with relational fault conditions,
i.e. fault conditions that relate faulted and valid signatures.
Although cast in a different context, the work reported in [5]
provides an excellent starting point. Yet another one would
be to use synthesis for discovering countermeasures against
fault attacks as done in [18] for side-channel attacks.
Whereas the focus of this paper is on implementations of
public key cryptography, our method would also apply to
the symmetric setting. Finding good fault conditions, as
well as the considerable size of the implementations would
make such an application challenging, but should allow fairly
easily to find attacks on the last few rounds of computation.
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